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While mobile telecommunications markets have largely been left unregulated
in Europe until recently, they have started to draw regulators’ and policy
makers’ attention in more recent times (see, e.g., European Commission,
2007). Apart from more narrowly deﬁned issues such as mobile number
portability, mobile termination rates, and international roaming, an area of
concern has also been the general competitiveness of the mobile telecommuni-
cations industry. For example, Ofcom and the UK Competition Commission
have argued that the mobile telecommunications industry as a whole is not
subject to eﬀective competition, due to the oligopolistic industry conﬁgu-
ration (see Competition Commission, 2003). Since there is only a limited
amount of radio spectrum available and as the ﬁxed and common costs asso-
ciated with mobile network investments are relatively high, mobile telecom-
munications markets have been argued to be natural oligopolies (see Gruber,
2001; Valletti, 2003). Accordingly, concerns have been voiced by various reg-
ulatory and competition authorities about competition in mobile telecom-
munications markets (or, more precisely, the lack thereof), especially with
respect to the potential for collusive behaviour.
In fact, as oligopolistic industries are often prone to collusion, it is impor-
tant to analyse the market participants’ conduct in these industries in more
detail. Apart from factors such as the number of operators, barriers to entry,
product diﬀerentiation, the ﬁrms’ cost structures, and market transparency,
one indicator for the ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in collusive behaviour is
the market’s and the ﬁrms’ demand elasticity (see, e.g., Carlton and Perloﬀ,
2004). If the market demand is relative inelastic, the ﬁrms’ rewards from
engaging in collusive conduct are relatively high, as prices can be increased
without loosing much custom. In contrast, a relatively elastic demand im-
4plies that the additional proﬁt from collusion is relatively low. In addition,
a high ﬁrm-speciﬁc elasticity of demand implies that deviating from a collu-
sive agreement is relatively proﬁtable (as a small price decrease generates a
relatively high increase in the quantity sold) so that collusion is more likely
to break down due to the “cheating problem”.
Moreover, demand elasticities have also been the subject of debate in vari-
ous hearings on price regulation and the allocation of common costs, for which
demand elasticities play an important role (e.g., for Ramsey pricing). Hence,
as demand elasticities have become a subject of debate, the number of stud-
ies that estimate demand elasticities has also been increasing, some of which
are reviewed below. This paper adds to this growing literature. However, in
contrast to most other research which is based on aggregate market data we
had access to ﬁrm-speciﬁc data from three diﬀerent competitors in the Aus-
trian mobile telecommunications market between January 1998 and March
2002. These three ﬁrms who are the three largest mobile operators in Austria
account for around 90% of the Austrian market for mobile telecommunica-
tions. In our analysis, we will use ﬁrm speciﬁc data on prices and quantities
for these ﬁrms and analyse price elasticities for mobile telecommunications
services. In more detail, we will ﬁrst analyse demand elasticities for diﬀerent
market segments, namely business customers and private consumers. More-
over, we also distinguish between prepaid and postpaid contracts in the case
of private households. Our results suggest that the elasticity of demand is
higher for business customers than for private consumers. Moreover, postpaid
consumers appear to have a more elastic demand than postpaid and prepaid
consumers taken together, which suggests that prepaid customers have a
lower elasticity of demand. Secondly, we analyse ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand elas-
ticities for the three operators, yielding short-run elasticities between -0.26
5and -0.40 and long-run elasticities between -0.47 and -1.1. While these ﬁnd-
ings are in line with evidence from other countries (see, e.g., New Zealand
Commerce Commission, 2003), they also indicate that demand elasticities
may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent operators. This, in turn, suggests that pricing
behaviour (especially mark-ups) may be quite diﬀerent between ﬁrms.
Finally, the estimation of demand elasticities also helps to determine the
eﬀects that consumer protection measures have on consumer surplus. Given
the European Commission’s increasing focus on consumer protection, it be-
comes more important to understand how diﬀerent groups of consumers (e.g.,
business customers versus private consumers) are aﬀected by consumer pro-
tection measures.
The remainder of the paper is now organised as follows: The next section
provides an overview over empirical studies of demand elasticities in mobile
telecommunications markets before section 3 oﬀers some basic facts on the
Austrian mobile telecommunications market and its historical development.
In section 4 we describe the data used and present our empirical speciﬁcations
for the demand equations. Finally, our main results and conclusions are
summarised in section 5.
2 Brief Review of the Empirical Literature
Empirical studies on demand elasticities for mobile markets have, in principle,
been using two diﬀerent approaches. While the ﬁrst approach is based on
highly aggregated data on country or regional level, a second method to
measure price elasticities relies on individual or survey data of consumer
behaviour.
Independently of whether aggregated or individual data has been used
most studies have found relatively moderate price elasticities. Hausman
6(1999) and (2000), for example, ﬁnds a price elasticity of access to mobile
services of -0.51, using aggregate data on 30 U.S. markets for the period
1988 to 1993. Analysing the price elasticity of subscription using data on
64 diﬀerent countries Ahn and Lee (1999) estimate an average elasticity of
-0.36.
Summarising the results from diﬀerent studies by DotEcon, Frontier Eco-
nomics and Holden Pearmain, the UK Competition Commission (2003) re-
ports own-price elasticities of mobile subscriptions between -0.08 and -0.54.
For mobile calls, own-price elasticities between -0.48 and -0.62 have been
measured. In a study on the Australian mobile market Access Economics
reports a price elasticity of -0.8 (see Competition Commission, 2003).
Rodini et al. (2002) analyse the substitutability between ﬁxed and mo-
bile access in the U.S. and, for this purpose, estimate own and cross-price
elasticities. Using survey data on telephony services Rodini et al. (2002) ﬁnd
own-price elasticities of -0.43 for mobile subscription rates. Furthermore, a
total elasticity of -0.6 is estimated for the access and usage price.
A quite diﬀerent approach to analyse conduct in mobile markets has been
carried out by Parker and R¨ oller (1997) and Grzybowski (2004). Both stud-
ies apply structural models in order to examine the competitve behaviour of
mobile operators. While Parker and R¨ oller (1997) ﬁnd an own-price elastic-
ity of -2.5 using data on the United States covering the period 1984-1988,
Grzybowski (2004) ﬁnds rather moderate elasticities for the EU countries in
1998-2002, ranging from -0.2 to -0.9. Similar results are reported by the New
Zealand Commerce Commission (2003) and by Manfrim and da Silva (2007)
for a number of additional studies.
In order to analyse the price elasticities of demand for the Austrian mobile
telecommunications market, and in contrast to existing studies, we (i) use
7data on ﬁrm speciﬁc tariﬀs and (ii) apply dynamic panel techniques. By these
means we are able to distinguish between short- and long–run elasticities and
to distinguish between consumer behaviour at the ﬁrm level.
3 The Austrian Market for Mobile Telecom-
munications
In contrast to most other European countries, the Austrian market for mo-
bile telecommunications services has only been liberalised and opened to
competition relatively late, namely in 1996. While mobile telecommunica-
tions services have been oﬀered since 1979, Mobilkom Austria, the former
state-owned enterprise, was allowed to operate as a monopoly provider until
October 1996 when max.mobil (now T-Mobile Austria) entered the market.
Then two years later, Connect Austria (now One) was granted a license, and
in 2000 a fourth carrier (tele.ring) entered the market (for details see Kruse
et al., 2004). The latter operator (tele.ring)h a sb e e nt a k e no v e rb yT-Mobile
Austria in late 2006, but yet another carrier (3 Austria, owned by Hutchison
3G) has entered the market in December 2003. Furthermore, Tele2 entered
the market as a so-called mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) in 2004,
using spare capacities on One’s network.
Even though deregulation and liberalisation have been introduced rather
late, Austria is nowadays one of the few European countries with four GSM-
1800 networks that provide almost full coverage.1 Moreover, further entry
may occur as another potential entrant, 3G Mobile (Telefonica), was suc-
cessful in the Austrian UMTS license auction in 2000 apart from the incum-
bents Mobilkom Austria, T-Mobile, One and tele.ring and the one entrant
1Other European countries with four mobile network operators are Finland, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, or the UK.
8(Hutchison 3G) that is now active in the market. Today, the Austrian mobile
telecommunications industry is considered to be one of the most competitive
ones in Europe (see WIK, 2002; Grzybowski, 2004).
Comparing the market shares of the “incumbent” carriers, we see that
Mobilkom’s market share has declined signiﬁcantly, while the other opera-
tors’ market shares have increased (see Figure 1). In December 2005, the
market share of the former state-owned monopolist, Mobilkom, was 39.5%
(T-Mobile 24.4 and One 20.7) but, more interestingly, the share of tele.ring
had increased from 2.6% in 2001 to 12.0% in 2005. In early 2006, tele.ring
was integrated into T-Mobile and by the end of 2006 Mobilkom’s share had
further declined to 37.6% with T-Mobile (incl. tele.ring)a n dOne reaching
35.3% and 21.1%, respectively. The market share for the latest entrant, 3
Austria, had increased to 3.3% until December 2005 and has reached 4.2%
in the fourth quarter of 2006. As can also be seen from Figure 1, the shares
of T-Mobile, the ﬁrst competitor, have decreased following the market entry
of One and tele.ring.
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Empirical Speciﬁcation
Data
To analyse short- and long-run elasticities, we use monthly data on mobile
telephone traﬃc in Austria over the period from January 1998 to March
2002. The data on prices, quantities and networks’ subscriber bases has been
9provided by the three largest Austrian mobile operators: Mobilkom, One and
T-Mobile. In total we have information on 37 diﬀerent tariﬀs oﬀered by the
three operators mentioned. These tariﬀs comprise 13 business tariﬀs, and 15
postpaid and 9 prepaid tariﬀs designed for private consumers (see Table 1
for a summary of the data). In addition, information on the price index has
been gathered from oﬃcial statistics of Austria.
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
For each of these 37 tariﬀs the variable ‘total number of outgoing minutes’
measures the monthly traﬃc (Q). The variable consists of the sum of all
outgoing call minutes, independent of the exact type of service (except for
SMS or data services). Hence, the variable represents an aggregate over
various services (such as on-net, oﬀ-net, mobile to ﬁxed, and international
calls) within a speciﬁc tariﬀ. To analyse price elasticities we have calculated
the average traﬃc per subscriber (q), using the ratio Q/TNet, where TNet
is the number of subscribers within a given tariﬀ.
Furthermore, we had to use an average call price (P), which has been
constructed by dividing the total revenue for each tariﬀ by the total number
of outgoing minutes for that tariﬀ. While mobile markets are characterised
by price diﬀerentiation between peak and oﬀ-peak times, more detailed data
has not been available to us. To obtain real prices P has been deﬂated
by the Austrian consumer price index. Furthermore, information on the
ﬁrms’ (total) subscriber bases (TNet) as well as time and ﬁrm dummies
have been used as explanatory variables. All variables but the dummies are
in logarithmic forms (see Table 2 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics).
10Speciﬁcations
A standard approach for the estimation of demand elasticities in telecommu-
nications is derived from the so-called Houthakker-Taylor model, which takes
possible path dependencies of consumption into account (see Houthakker
and Taylor, 1970). In mobile telecommunications, consumption in any given
month should depend on consumption in previous months because consumers
tend to conclude contracts that last for more than a month. In fact, in Aus-
tria the standard contract duration is 12 months. Even without ﬁxed contract
durations (as with prepaid contracts) switching costs matter for consumption
decisions (see, e.g., Buehler, Dewenter and Haucap, 2006). Furthermore, con-
sumer behaviour may only change gradually if consumers form habits about
their calling patterns. This may also be supported by the fact that many
consumers only ”discover” price changes once they receive their monthly bill
or once they purchase a new prepaid card. This would also suggest that some
consumers do not immediately react to price changes, but only slowly. For
these reasons we expect long-run elasticities to diﬀer from short-run elastic-
ities, as consumers may only react with some time lag. If consumers’ calling
behaviour is shaped by habits and routines, demand is expected to be more
elastic in the long-run when consumers change their consumption patterns.
According to the Houthakker-Taylor model, demand q at time t can be ex-




t where pt denotes price at time t (see Taylor, 1994).
Hence, the model allows us to distinguish between short-run and long-run
elasticities of demand where short-run price elasticity is determined by η,
whereas the long-run price elasticity equals η/(1 − φ). Taking into account
the panel structure of the data, the following speciﬁcation can be derived:






δk lnxit,k + εit. (1)
11where qit is the average quantity demanded for tariﬀ i at time t, pjt is the
respective average price for the tariﬀ under consideration (j = i) and all other
tariﬀs (j  = i). Furthermore, xit,k’s are k additional explanatory variables,
εit is an error term, and β,t h eγj’s and the δk’s are the parameters to be
estimated. Hence, yi is the short-run own price elasticity and the yj’s are
the short-run cross-price elasticities (for j  = i). However, since usual panel
data techniques lead to biased results in this case, not only because prices
are endogenous, but also because of the lagged endogenous variable qit−1,
a dynamic panel analysis is more appropriate. Applying a ﬁrst diﬀerence
transformation of equation (1) leads to






δk∆lnxit,k +∆ εit, (2)
which can be consistently estimated using a GMM approach as suggested
by Arellano and Bond (1991).2 Prices should, of course, be endogeneous in
the data (as may be other variables such as the subscriber base). This is
because consumers and mobile operators know the tariﬀ-speciﬁc unobserved
component, εit, so that the error term is correlated with the endogenous
variables. In order to identify the model adequate instruments are required.
An instrument is statistically valid if it is highly correlated with the variable
to be instrumented and, at the same time, it is uncorrelated with the error
term of the equation to be estimated. While ideally one would use a variable
that identiﬁes cost shifts, such variables are commonly not available, how-
ever. One alternative may consist in the use of lagged endogenous variables
(such as pit−1). This, however, may prove problematic if there is ﬁrst-order
2Arellano and Bond (1991) also provide a heteroscedastic robust estimator. Since the
GMM estimator is not consistent if variables are characterized by second order autocorre-
lation, Arellano and Bond have derived an adequate test of autocorrelation. Furthermore,
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions on the number of instruments can be applied.
12autocorrelation. Instead either prices for similar services or other ﬁrms’s
prices (or the average thereof) may be used (see, e.g. Kaiser and Wright,
2006). The intuition would be that cost shocks will aﬀect instruments and
endogenous variables in similar ways without aﬀecting demand for the .
In the following, we will estimate both market demand elasticities for
diﬀerent market segments and ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand elasticities for the three
mobile operators. In order to estimate market demand elasticities we will
divide the Austrian mobile telecommunications market into a business and
a private consumer segment. In the latter case, we will furthermore also
distinguish between prepaid and postpaid tariﬀs.3 For all our estimations
we will use the same data described above. However, the 37 tariﬀs will be
divided into diﬀerent groups for the two estimation strategies to identify both
market and ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand elasticities.
In order to address the risk of regressions being spurious we ﬁrst have
applied panel unit root tests for the variables used in this study. While
the pooled panel estimator yields consistent estimates even if some of the
variables are integrated of order one (or higher) and also independently of
the existence of a cointegrating relation (see Phillips and Moon, 1999), only
long-run relationships can be analysed using the integrated variables in this
case. Using lagged variables is not appropriate though. Thus, the ﬁrst step
is to test the samples against unit roots using a non-parametric approach
as suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999).4 The authors suggest to choose
a test-statistic by Fisher (1932) where the p-values of single unit root tests
(πi) from each cross-sectional unit i =1 ,...,N are used to calculate the
3Note that, as in most other countries, prepaid tariﬀs are not used for business cus-
tomers in Austria.
4While there is a set of unit root tests for panel data, tests such as those proposed by
Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) are not appropriate here since our samples are unbalanced.
13test statistic pλ = −2
N
i=1 ln(πi) ∼ χ2
2N. In order to account for possible
autocorrelated and heteroscdastic errors, Phillips-Perron tests (see Phillips
1987 and Phillips and Perron, 1988) have been applied to each time series to
calculate respective p-values.5 We have tested for unit roots both when tariﬀs
are grouped into market segments (business, postpaid and prepaid customers)
and when tariﬀs are sorted by ﬁrms (One, T-Mobile and Mobilkom). As one
can see, Table 3 in the Appendix, which provides the unit root test statistics,
there is little evidence that the variables are integrated. In all but one case
(lnTNet for Mobilkom) the null hypothesis (existence of unit roots) can be
rejected. However, one may note that looking at the individual tariﬀ data
some of the tariﬀ time series can be found to be integrated of order one. This
is not a problem for our analysis, however, as we estimate ﬁrst diﬀerences as
speciﬁed in equation (2).6
First, we have analysed demand elasticities for both business customers and
private consumers, which we consider to be at least diﬀerent market seg-
ments if not entirely diﬀerent markets. Since estimating all cross-price elas-
ticities, as indicated in equation (2), has lead to manifest problems of multi-
collinearity, we had to conﬁne ourselves to the estimations of own-price elas-
ticities only. We consider this less dramatic than it may appear at ﬁrst
sight because most consumers will only respond to price changes within their
chosen tariﬀ, as they cannot easily switch to possibly less expensive tariﬀs,
at least not in the short-run, due to contract duration and other switching
costs. Of course, our estimated long-run elasticities may be underestimated
5The number of lags used for each series has been calculated by l = int(4·(T/100)(2/9))
(see Newey and West, 1987), where T is the number of observations.
6The problem of unit roots is typically not addressed when telecommunications demand
is estimated. For example, both Das and Srinivasan (1999) and Ahn and Lee (1999) neglect
the problem of non-stationary variables so that spurious correlations may lead to biased
results.
14as cross-price eﬀects have been neglected. This means that the true long-run
elasticities should be higher than our estimates.
As prices are clearly endogenous, as may be the size of the subscriber
base, we have to instrument both explanatory variables in our equations to
be estimated.7 For our estimations of the demand elasticity of business cus-
tomers, we use the average price and subscriber base of prepaid contracts as
instruments. Conversely, to estimate the demand elasticities for the two pri-
vate consumer market segments (prepaid and postpaid) we use the average
price and subscriber base of business customers as instruments. The reason
is that we expect the diﬀerent market segments’ demand functions to be
largely independent from each other, while, at the same time, we expect cost
shocks to aﬀect both market segments in similar ways. Hence, we consider
these instruments to be valid.8 To estimate ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand elasticities,
we have also used the average prices and subscriber bases of prepaid con-
tracts as instruments for the respective variables of business customers and
average business prices and subscriber bases to instrument private consumer
variables. As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5 Sargan tests cannot reject
orthogonality of the instruments at the usual signifcance levels.
4.2 Results
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis for diﬀerent market segments.
Almost all relevant coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant and show the ex-
pected signs. The coeﬃcients ∆lnpt can be interpreted as short-run demand
7Hausman-Wu tests (see Greene, 2003) have been applied to test for the possible en-
dogeneity of current prices and the size of the subscriber base. However, the tests failed
to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
8In another set of regressions, we have also used lagged prices and lagged subscriber
base ﬁgures as alternative instruments. The results to be presented below remained largely
unchanged.
15elasticities. If business customers and private consumers are considered to
be entirely diﬀerent markets (and not only market segments), the estimated
coeﬃcients can be interpreted as market demand elasticities. In line with al-
most all other empirical studies of telecommunications demand, the demand
for mobile telecommunications services in Austria is found to be relatively
inelastic in the short run. However, business customers have a more elastic
demand (-0.33) than private consumers (-0.14).9 Among the private con-
sumers demand appears to be more elastic for customers on postpaid con-
tracts (-0.22) than for prepaid contract customers where we do not ﬁnd a
statitically signiﬁcant elasticity. While it may appear somewhat surprising
that business consumers have a more elastic demand (given that a ﬁrm’s
employees ususally do not pay for calls themselves so that a principal-agent
problem results), the lower demand elasticity for private consumers may be
due to the low demand elasticity that prepaid consumers exhibit. In fact, the
long-run elasticities of demand are roughly the same for business customers
and private postpaid consumers. Moreover, principal-agent problems should
be less severe in small and family ﬁrms which may exhibit a larger elasticity
of demand.
Regarding prepaid tariﬀs, we were unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant demand
elasticity. A potential reason may be that many (if not most) consumers ap-
pear to purchase a prepaid card (usually bundled with a mobile telephone)
in order to receive calls and not to place calls. Furthermore, subscriber num-
bers are less reliable than for either business or postpaid customers because
consumers do not have to cancel their contract once they decide not to use
their prepaid account any longer. Hence, the subscriber number for prepaid
consumers may be overstated in our sample (and the operators’ accounts,
9The 24 private consumer tariﬀs consist of the sum of the 15 postpaid and the 9 prepaid
tariﬀs.
16respectively), and, therefore, the traﬃc per active subscriber understated.
As expected, long-run elasticities are higher for all market segments in line
with the reasoning provided above.
Also note that the past month’s traﬃc positively aﬀects current traﬃc
numbers. As mentioned before, this is not surprising given habitual con-
sumer behaviour. Since qt is deﬁned as qt ≡ Qt/TNet, a negative coeﬃcient
for lnTNetmeans that the average quantity consumed per subscriber is de-
creasing with an increasing subscriber base. One reason should be that the
marginal customer consumes less than the average customer. This means,
that additional consumers (who are relatively late adapters) use their mobile
telephone less than the early adapters. The ﬁnding may also suggest that
ﬁrm-speciﬁc network eﬀects (should they exist, maybe due to a diﬀerenti-
ation between on-net and oﬀ-net tariﬀs), are not so strong that additional
customers would lead to an increase in the average quantity consumed.10
*** Insert Table 4 about here ***
Analysing ﬁrms instead of market segments leads to quite diﬀerent results,
as elasticities can now be interpreted as ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than market
demand elasticities. As can be seen from Table 5, short-run as well as long-
run elasticities tend to be a bit higher on average than those calculated for
market segments. The reasoning behind these diﬀerences is that ﬁrms com-
pete with each other over similar tariﬀs (i.e. prepaid, postpaid and business
tariﬀs). Price changes should therefore lead to stronger variations in short-
run demand and also result in higher churn rates which in turn increases
10Note that with strong network eﬀects adding another consumer could lead to an
increase in the average quantity consumed. To explore this possibility, we have not only
used TNet, but also the variable Net (which is the subscriber base per tariﬀ). However,
neither use of the tariﬀ speciﬁc subscriber base (Net) nor use of the ﬁrm’s total subscriber
base (TNet) has produced evidence for such strong network eﬀects.
17long-run demand elasticities. Again, long-run elasticities are, as expected,
considerably higher than short-run numbers. For example the average price
elasticity of demand is about -1.1 for T-Mobile, which is relatively high com-
pared to other studies. Moreover, subscriber bases have, again, a negative
and statictically signiﬁcant impact on demand per subscriber.
*** Insert Table 5 about here ***
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the demand for mobile telecommunications
services in Austria. Dynamic panel data techniques have been applied in
order to estimate short- and long-run price elasticities. In contrast to most
other research we had access to ﬁrm-speciﬁc data on 37 diﬀerent tariﬀs from
three competitors in three market segments (business customers, postpaid
and prepaid private consumers) between January 1998 and March 2002.
These three ﬁrms who are the three largest mobile operators in Austria have
accounted for around 90% of the Austrian mobile telecommunications market
for the period of our analysis.
First, we have analysed short-run demand elasticities for business cus-
tomers and private consumers and have, in a second step, also distinguished
between prepaid and postpaid contracts in the case of private households.
Our results suggest that business customers have a more elastic demand
than private consumers. Among the private consumers demand appears to
be more elastic for customers on postpaid contracts than for prepaid contract
customers where we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant elasticity. Long-run
elasticities are higher for all market segments which is consistent with our
expectations as habitual behaviour with respect to consumer calling habits
18will only change slowly. Furthermore, consumers cannot easily switch to
possibly less expensive tariﬀs in the short-run due to contract duration and
other switching costs. And ﬁnally consumers may also only react slowly to
price changes as they only ”discover” the new prices once they receive their
monthly bill in the case of postpaid customers and possibly even later in the
case of prepaid customers.
Moreover, we have analysed ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand elasticities for the three
operators, yielding short-run elasticities between -0.26 and -0.40 and long-run
elasticities between -0.46 and -1.1. The diﬀerences between the operators’
demand elasticities suggests that mark-ups between ﬁrms will also diﬀer,
which should be taken into account for competition analysis purposes.
Finally, we have found subscriber bases to have a negative and stat-
ictically signiﬁcant impact on demand per subscriber in all of our regres-
sions, which may suggest that additional consumers (who are relatively late
adapters) use their mobile telephone less than the early adapters. In con-
trast, the past month’s traﬃc positively aﬀects current traﬃc numbers in
our regressions which supports the notion that habitual consumer behavioˆ ur
may also play a role in mobile telecommunications as suggested by Taylor
(1994).
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ONE 99 One 32
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B-free Classic Mobilkom 39
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Take ONE One 32
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klax.max T-Mobile 39
25Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
lnpt lnqt lnTNet
Business tariﬀs
Mean -5.25 5.39 8.81
N 348 327 327
S.D. 0.76 0.73 2.85
Postpaid tariﬀs
Mean -5.25 4.93 10.51
N 369 346 380
S.D. 0.89 0.67 2.31
Prepaid tariﬀs
Mean -4.82 3.60 10.51
N 243 216 221
S.D. 0.67 0.65 3.32
One
Mean -5.84 4.95 8.05
N 273 345 374
S.D. 0.36 0.76 3.03
T-Mobile
Mean -5.81 4.72 11.68
N 208 196 206
S.D. 0.63 0.97 1.44
Mobilkom
Mean -4.45 4.65 10.86
N 479 348 348
S.D. 0.36 1.14 2.15
26Table 3: Maddala-Wu Unit Root Tests
lnpt lnqt lnTNet
Business tariﬀs
χ2 88.53 187.73 114.83
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Postpaid tariﬀs
χ2 98.43 243.98 198.57
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prepaid tariﬀs
χ2 171.44 121.10 56.82
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
One
χ2 134.82 273.91 228.88
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
T-Mobile
χ2 30.85 115.87 112.48
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mobilkom
χ2 72.29 122.36 28.87
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31)
27Table 4: One-Step GMM Estimates of Mobile Demand (Customer Groups)
Business Private Consumer Postpaid Prepaid
Tariﬀs Tariﬀs Tariﬀs Tariﬀs
∆lnqt−1 0.5509 0.6249 0.6374 0.5790
(10.70) (10.90) (5.24) (7.37)
∆lnpt -0.3316 -0.1393 -0.2437 -0.0828
(-4.52) (-1.93) (-3.36) (-1.54)
∆lnTNet -0.0324 -0.0788 -0.0187 -0.1693
(-2.84) (-2.50) (-0.97) (-12.66)
Constant -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0030 0.0040
(-0.32) (-0.32) (-1.08) (0.58)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
Sargan Test 285.25 528.25 371.04 199.64
(Prob.) (0.22) (0.27) (0.54) (0.33)
AR(1)-Test -6.63 -7.66 -1.49 -4.82
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00)
AR(2)-Test -1.04 -1.22 1.21 -1.31
(Prob.) (0.29) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19)
Nobs 272 476 286 190
No. of Groups 13 24 15 9
Long Run Elasticity -0.74 -0.37 -0.67 -0.20
Standard Error 0.0857 0.0275 0.1429 0.2419
Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Standard errors for long-run elasticities calculated using the delta method (see
Greene,2003).
28Table 5: One-Step GMM Estimates of Mobile Demand (Firms)
One T-Mobile Mobilkom
∆lnqt−1 0.4423 0.6380 0.6879
(5.70) (5.93) (11.02)
∆lnpt -0.2594 -0.3976 -0.3354
(-4.47) (-4.45) (-2.43)
∆lnTNet -0.0606 -0.1358 -0.1230
(-2.27) (-3.85) (-1.23)
Constant -0.0006 0.0018 -0.0059
(0.17) (1.62) (-1.70)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Sargan Test 369.00 204.57 309.20
(Prob.) (0.33) (0.22) (0.31)
AR(1)-Test -4.31 -4.92 -7.08
(Prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2)-Test -1.02 0.89 -1.13
(Prob.) (0.30) (0.37) (0.26)
Nobs 254 176 322
No. of Groups 17 7 13
Long Run Elasticity -0.47 -1.10 -1.08
Standard Error 0.0524 0.1153 0.2529
Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Standard errors for long-run elasticities calculated using the delta method (see
Greene,2003).
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